A combinatorial framework for adversarial network coding is presented. Channels are described by specifying the possible actions that one or more (possibly coordinated) adversaries may take. Upper bounds on three notions of capacity-the one-shot capacity, the zero-error capacity, and the compound zero-error capacity-are obtained for point-to-point channels, and generalized to corresponding capacity regions appropriate for multi-source networks. A key result of this paper is a general method by which bounds on these capacities in point-to-point channels may be ported to networks. This technique is illustrated in detail for Hamming-type channels with multiple adversaries operating on specific coordinates, which correspond, in the context of networks, to multiple adversaries acting on specific network edges. Capacity-achieving coding schemes are described for some of the considered adversarial models.
Various adversarial models have been investigated in the context of network coding. For example, Byzantine attacks are studied in [9] and [10] , in which omniscient adversaries, secret-sharing models, and adversaries of limited eavesdropping power are considered. Adversaries who can control some of the network's vertices are investigated in [11] and [12] . End-to-end approaches to error control in random and coherent network coding were proposed in [13] [14] [15] , along with efficient coding and decoding schemes based on rank-metric and subspace codes. Other models were proposed in [16] [17] [18] . Adversaries controlling a channel state within probabilistic channel models were studied in [19] .
Fan-out set descriptions of adversaries in point-to-point channels were proposed in [15, Sec. III] , investigating connections between such descriptions and the concept of correction capability of a code.
The problem of error correction in the context of multisource random linear network coding was recently addressed in [20] [21] [22] [23] , and capacity-achieving schemes in this context were given in [23] .
Although a wide variety of network adversarial models have been studied by various authors (mainly focusing on single-source linear network coding), a unified combinatorial treatment of adversarial network channels seems to be absent. One of the goals of this paper is to fill this gap. In particular, this paper makes the following contributions.
Whereas noisy channels are usually described probabilistically, adversarial channels are described possibilistically, i.e., by describing the set of possible channel outputs that may result from a given channel input, as in Shannon's work [24] on the zero-error capacity of a channel. This approach gives rise to a combinatorial approach to defining and studying channels, and is motivated by the fact that a network adversary may not be specified via random variables and probability distributions. In Section II we define codes, one-shot capacity, channel products, and the zero-error capacity of a channel, and we describe how this approach relates to Shannon's work. We then define two fundamental channel operations: "concatenation" and "union," and we establish their main algebraic properties. We also show how they relate to each other and to the notions of capacity.
In Section III we study certain adversarial channels called "Hamming-type channels," whose input alphabet is a Cartesian product of the form A s . We consider multiple adversaries who can corrupt or erase the components of an element x ∈ A s , according to certain restrictions, and explicitly compute the one-shot capacity, the zero-error capacity and the compound zero-error capacity of these channels. This extends a number of classical results in coding theory.
The study of networks starts with Section IV. In contrast to previous approaches (e.g., [1] , [2] ), our framework allows for multi-source networks with a wide variety of adversarial models. We propose three notions of capacity region of a multi-source adversarial network, which we call the "one-shot capacity region," the "zero-error capacity region," and the "compound zero-error capacity region" (see Subsection IV-D for precise definitions). Most previous work in adversarial network coding implicitly focus on one-shot models (cf. also Remark 55), while to our best knowledge zero-error and compound zero-error adversarial models have not so far been investigated.
The centerpiece of this paper is Section V, in which we show that any upper bounds for the capacities of Hammingtype channels can be ported to the networking context in a systematic manner. Using the channel operations defined in Section II, we show that this "porting technique" applies to all three notions of capacity region mentioned above, in the general context of multi-source networks. Moreover, this method does not require the underlying network to be regular, in the sense of [2, Definition 4] .
These theoretical results are then applied to concrete networking contexts in Section VI, where we study multiple adversaries, each with possibly different error and erasure powers, having access to prescribed subsets of the network edges. The adversaries are in principle allowed to coordinate with each other. We derive upper bounds for the three capacity regions of such adversarial networks, extending certain results of [2] to multiple adversaries (restricted or not) and multisource networks.
In Section VII, we give capacity-achieving schemes for some of the adversarial scenarios investigated in Section VI. Incorporating also ideas from [23] and [25] , we show that linear network coding suffices to achieve any integer point of the capacity regions associated with some simple adversaries. We then adapt these communication schemes to compound models. Finally, we show that for some adversarial networks capacity cannot be achieved with linear network coding.
Other classes of adversaries (such as rank-metric adversaries and multiple adversaries having access to overlapping sets of the network edges) are briefly discussed in Section VIII. Finally, Section IX is devoted to conclusions and a discussion of open problems.
II. ADVERSARIAL CHANNELS
In this section we define and study point-to-point adversarial channels, one-shot codes, and one-shot capacity. We then describe the channel product construction, and define the zero-error capacity of an adversarial channel, as proposed by Shannon [24] .
In the second part of the section we introduce two channel operations, which we call "concatenation" and "union," showing how they relate to each other and to the channel product. These two constructions will play a crucial role throughout the paper in the study of several point-to-point and network channels.
A. Channels, Codes, Capacity
An adversarial channel is described by an input alphabet X , an output alphabet Y, and a collection {(x) : x ∈ X } of nonempty subsets of Y, one for each x ∈ X . The set (x) ⊆ Y, called the fan-out set of x, is the set of all symbols y ∈ Y that the adversary can cause to be received when the input symbol x ∈ X is transmitted. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 1: An (adversarial) channel is a map : X → 2 Y \ {∅}, where X and Y are finite non-empty sets called the input and output alphabet, respectively. We denote such an adversarial channel by : X Y, and say that is deterministic if |(x)| = 1 for all x ∈ X . A (one-shot) code for the channel is a non-empty subset C ⊆ X . We say that C is good for when (x) ∩ (x ) = ∅ for all x, x ∈ C with x = x .
In words, a good code for a channel : X Y is a selection of input symbols from X whose fan-out sets are pairwise disjoint. If channel inputs are restricted to a good code, it is impossible for an adversary to cause confusion at the receiver about the transmitted symbol.
Definition 2: The (one-shot) capacity, C 1 (), of a channel : X Y is the real number C 1 () := max{log 2 |C| : C ⊆ X is good for }.
Example 3: Let X , Y be finite non-empty sets with Y ⊇ X . The identity channel Id : X Y is defined by (x) := {x} for all x ∈ X . We have C 1 (Id) = log 2 |X |.
Example 4: Let X := F 4 2 . Consider an adversary who is capable of corrupting at most one of the components of any x ∈ F 4 2 . The action of the adversary is described by the channel H : Channels with the same input and output alphabets can be compared as follows.
Definition 5: Let 1 , 2 : X Y be channels. We say that 1 is finer than 2 (in symbols, 1 ≤ 2 or 2 ≥ 1 ) when 1 (x) ⊆ 2 (x) for all x ∈ X . If 1 ≤ 2 , then every code that is good for 2 is good for 1 as well. In particular, we have C 1 ( 1 ) ≥ C 1 ( 2 ).
We conclude this subsection by proposing a definition of isomorphic channels, relating in particular the fan-out set description of channels adopted in this paper with the approach taken by Shannon [24] .
Definition 6: The adjacency function α : X × X → {0, 1} of a channel : X Y is defined, for all x, x ∈ X , by α (x, x ) := 1 if (x) ∩ (x ) = ∅, and α (x, x ) := 0 otherwise. We say that channels 1 : X 1 Y 1 and 2 : X 2 Y 2 are isomorphic (in symbols, 1 ∼ = 2 ) if there exists a bijection f : X 1 → X 2 such that α 1 (x, x ) = α 2 ( f (x), f (x )) for all (x, x ) ∈ X 1 × X 2 .
The adjacency function of captures the "ambiguity relations" among the input symbols of . Channels 1 and 2 are isomorphic if their input symbols have the same ambiguity relations, for some identification of their input alphabets. (One can easily show that the channel isomorphism is an equivalence relation.) This is the way that channels are described and studied by Shannon [24] . The choice of the fanout set description of channels for this paper will be motivated in Remark 16.
B. Products of Channels and Zero-Error Capacity
Adversarial channels 1 and 2 can be naturally combined with each other via a product construction.
Definition 7: The product of channels 1 :
The following result shows two important properties of the channel product.
Proposition 8: Let 1 , 2 , 3 be channels. Then
Proof: The first property is straightforward. To see the second, observe that if C 1 and C 2 are good codes for 1 and 2 (respectively), then C 1 × C 2 is good for 1 × 2 . Note that, in general, the lower bound of part 2 of Proposition 8 is not tight, i.e., the capacity of the product channel 1 × 2 can be strictly larger than the sum of the capacities of the channels 1 and 2 . The following example, which will be used repeatedly in the paper, illustrates this point. 
We conclude the example by showing a structural property of any good code C for H 2 with |C| = 5. The property will be needed later in Example 56.
Let C ⊆ F 4 2 × F 4 2 be any good code for H 2 with |C| = 5. We claim that there are no two codewords of C that coincide in the first four components. To see this, denote by x, y, z, t, u the elements of C, and assume by contradiction that, say, x 1 = y 1 . Without loss of generality, we may assume x = 0 (and thus y 1 = 0). Then the vectors z 1 , t 1 , u 1 must have Hamming weight at least 3. Indeed, if, say, z 1 has Hamming weight smaller than 3, then {x 2 , y 2 , z 2 } ⊆ F 4 2 is a code of cardinality 3 and minimum Hamming distance 3, contradicting C 1 (H) = 1. On the other hand, since z 1 , t 1 , u 1 have Hamming weight at least 3, we have d H (z 1 ,
Since C is good for H 2 , {z 2 , t 2 , u 2 } must be a code of cardinality 3 and minimum Hamming distance 3, again contradicting the fact that C 1 (H) = 1.
Definition 10: Let n ≥ 1 be an integer. The n-th power of a channel : X Y is the channel n := × · · · × n times : X n Y n .
Note that n models n uses of .
We can now define the zero-error capacity of a channel, and relate it to the one-shot capacity. The following two results essentially already appear in Shannon's paper [24] . We state them in the language of fan-out sets for convenience. See [26] for a general reference on Zero-Error Information Theory.
Definition 11: The zero-error capacity of a channel is the real number
It is easy to see that C 0 () is a non-negative number for every channel . A less immediate property is that the supremum in the definition of zero-capacity is in fact a limit (see [27] or [28, Sec. 1.9]).
One-shot capacity and zero-error capacity relate to each other as follows. The proof is left to the reader.
Proposition 12: Let : X Y be a channel. The following hold.
In general, the zero-error capacity of a channel is strictly larger than its one-shot capacity. This is the case, for example, for the channel H of Example 4.
We conclude this subsection by observing that the isomorphism class of a product of channels only depends on the isomorphism classes of the constituent channels. Moreover, as one may expect, isomorphic channels have the same one-shot and zero-error capacities.
Proposition 13: Let 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 be channels. 1) If 1 ∼ = 2 and 3 ∼ = 4 , then 1 × 3 ∼ = 2 × 4 .
2) If 1 ∼ = 2 , then n 1 ∼ = n 2 for all n ∈ N ≥1 .
C. Concatenation and Union of Channels
In this subsection we define and study the concatenation and union of adversarial channels. We start with the concatenation of channels 1 and 2 , which models the situation where the output of 1 is taken as the input to 2 without any intermediate processing.
Definition 14: Let 1 : X 1 Y 1 and 2 : X 2 Y 2 be channels, with Y 1 ⊆ X 2 . The concatenation of 1 and 2 is the channel 1 2 : X 1 Y 2 defined by 1 2 is not determined by the isomorphism classes of 1 and 2 (examples can be easily found). This crucial difference between channel product and channel concatenation (cf. Proposition 13) motivates the choice of the fan-out sets language in this paper.
The following result is the analogue of Proposition 8 for the channel concatenation. The proof can be found in Appendix.
Proposition 17: Let 1 , 2 , 3 be channels. Then:
provided that all of the above concatenations are defined.
We now state an identity showing that the product of the concatenation of channels is the concatenation of their products. This property will be needed later for the analysis of certain classes of network channels (see Lemma 62). The proof can be found in Appendix.
Proposition 18: Let n, m ∈ N ≥1 , and let k,i be channels,
, provided that all of the above concatenations are defined. Corollary 19: Let be a channel, and let n ≥ 1 be an integer. Assume that 1 , . . . , n and 1 , . . . , n are channels for which the concatenation k k is defined for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Then The following result is the zero-error analogue of part 2 of Proposition 17. The proof is in Appendix.
Proposition 20:
We now define the union of a family of channels having the same input and output alphabets. This channel operation will be used later in Sections III and V to study compound adversarial models.
Definition 21: Let { i } i∈I be a family of channels, where I is a finite index set and i : X Y for all i ∈ I . The union of the family { i } i∈I is the channel denoted as and defined by
One can check that every channel can be written as the union of deterministic channels. Moreover, union and concatenation relate to each other as follows. The proof can be found in Appendix.
Proposition 22: Let { i } i∈I be as in Definition 21. Let 1 , 2 be channels for which the concatenation 1 i 2 is defined for all i ∈ I (we do not require {1, 2} ∩ I = ∅). Then i∈I
III. HAMMING-TYPE CHANNELS
In this section we study channels whose input alphabet is of the form A s , where A is a finite set with |A| ≥ 2 (the alphabet), and s ∈ N ≥1 . We call these channels "Hammingtype channels". In the sequel we work with a fixed alphabet A and a fixed s. If u ≥ 1 is any integer, we write [u] for the set {1, . . . , u}. We also define the extended alphabetÂ := A ∪ {}, where / ∈ A is a symbol denoting an erasure. Notation 23: It is convenient for Hamming-type channels to express the capacity as a logarithm in base |A|, rather than in base 2. In this paper, if : A s Y is a channel, where Y is any output alphabet, we abuse notation and write C 1 () for C 1 () · log 2 |A|, and C 0 () for C 0 () · log 2 |A|.
The components of a vector x ∈ A s are denoted by x = (x 1 , . . . , x s ). If n ≥ 1 is an integer, we denote by (x 1 , . . . , x n ) a generic element of (A s ) n .
A. Error-and-Erasure Adversaries
We start by recalling/introducing some concepts from classical coding theory.
Definition 24: For every positive integer u, the minimum
For all positive integers a and d, with a > 1 and 1
The U -discrepancy between y ∈Â s and x ∈ A s is δ(y, x; U ) := |{i ∈ U : y i ∈ A and y i = x i }|. The U -erasure weight of y ∈Â s is ω (y; U ) := |{i ∈ U :
We now describe an adversary having access to a certain set of coordinates U ⊆ [s], and with limited error and erasure power. 
for all x ∈ A s . Note that H t,e U models the scenario where an adversary can erase up to e components with indices from the set U , and change up to t such components into different symbols from A.
It is well known from classical coding theory that Assume 0 < |U | < s. Denote by π : A s → A s−u the projection on the coordinates outside U , and let C ⊆ A s be a capacity-achieving good code for H t,e U . By restricting the domain and the codomain of π, we obtain a surjective map π : C → π(C) ⊆ A s−u . It is easy to see that for all z ∈ π(C) we have log |A| |π −1 (z)| ≤ β(|A|, u, 2t +e+1). We can write C as a disjoint union C = z∈π(C) π −1 (z), from which we see that |C| ≤ |π(C)| · |A| β , where β := β(|A|, u, 2t + e + 1). Thus log |A| |C| ≤ log |A| |π(C)| + β(|A|, u, 2t + e + 1) ≤ s − u + β(|A|, u, 2t + e + 1). Finally, the upper bound is achieved by any code of the form C = D × A s−u , where D ⊆ A u is a code with |D| = 1 if u ≤ 2t + e, and a code with log |A| |D| = β(|A|, s, u) and minimum distance at least 2t + e + 1 otherwise.
A more general scenario consists of multiple adversaries acting on pairwise disjoint sets of coordinates with different powers. Such a collection of adversaries can be described as follows.
Definition 27: For L ≥ 1, let U 1 , . . . , U L ⊆ [s] be pairwise disjoint subsets. Let t 1 , . . . , t L and e 1 , . . . , e L be non-negative integers. Set U := (U 1 , . . . , U L ), t := (t 1 , . . . , t L ) and e := (e 1 , . . . , e L ). The channel H t,e U : 
, as the following example shows. This reflects the fact that L adversaries acting on different sets U 's, with error and erasure powers t 's and e 's, are not equivalent to a single adversary acting on U 1 ∪· · ·∪U L with error and erasure powers t 1 + · · · + t and e 1 + · · · + e , respectively. In particular, upper bounds from classical coding theory do not extend in any obvious way from one to multiple adversaries. 
B. Compound Channels
In Section II we introduced the concepts of (one-shot) capacity and zero-error capacity of a general adversarial channel. We now define a third notion of capacity for the specific class of Hamming-type channels, which we call the compound zero-error capacity.
Notation 30: Let L ≥ 1 be an integer, and let V ⊆ [s],
Let L ≥ 1 and U 1 , . . . , U L ⊆ [s] be pairwise disjoint subsets. Let t 1 , . . . , t L and e 1 , . . . , e L be non-negative integers. Define the L-tuples U := (U 1 , . . . , U L ), t := (t 1 , . . . , t L ) and e := (e 1 , . . . , e L ).
We consider the situation where a channel H t,e U is used n times, but the adversaries are forced to act on the same sets of coordinates in every channel use. By this we mean that the -th adversary freely chooses a set of components V ⊆ U whose size does not exceed t + e , and operates on those components in each channel use, according to its error/erasure power. The set of vulnerable components is unknown to the source, and no feedback is allowed. This scenario can be mathematically modeled via the channel union operation (see Section II-C) as follows. Definition 31: Let L ≥ 1, U := (U 1 , . . . , U L ), t := (t 1 , . . . , t L ) and e := (e 1 , . . . , e L ) be as in Definition 27. For n ≥ 1, the compound channel H t,e U n,cp :
The compound zero-error capacity of the channel H t,e U is the number
The following proposition shows how one-shot capacity, zero-error capacity and compound zero-error capacity relate to each other. The proof is left to the reader.
Proposition 32: Let L ≥ 1 be an integer, U := (U 1 , . . . , U L ), t := (t 1 , . . . , t L ) and e := (e 1 , . . . , e L ) be as in Definition 27. For all n ≥ 1 we have n · C 1 (H t,e U) ≤ C 1 (H t,e U n ) ≤ C 1 (H t,e U n,cp ).
In particular, C 1 (H t,e U) ≤ C 0 (H t,e U) ≤ C 0,cp (H t,e U).
C. Capacities of Hamming-Type Channels
The goal of this subsection is to establish the following general theorem on the capacities of a Hamming-type channel of the form H t,e U.
Theorem 33: Let L ≥ 1, U := (U 1 , . . . , U L ), t := (t 1 , . . . , t L ) and e := (e 1 , . . . , e L ) be as in Definition 27. For all n ≥ 1 we have
In particular,
min{2t + e , |U |}.
Moreover, all the above inequalities are achieved with equality if A = F q and q is sufficiently large. We will need the following preliminary result, whose proof can be found in Appendix.
Lemma 34: Let L ≥ 1, U := (U 1 , . . . , U L ), t := (t 1 , . . . , t L ) and e := (e 1 , . . . , e L ) be as in Definition 27. Define σ := min{2t + e , |U |} for all 1 ≤ ≤ L, and
3) There exist V = (V 1 , . . . , V L ) ⊆ U and V = (V 1 , . . . , V L ) ⊆ U with the following properties:
We can now prove the main result of this section.
Proof of Theorem 33: Let σ := min{2t + e , |U |} for all 1 ≤ ≤ L, and σ := σ 1 + · · · + σ L . We only show the theorem for σ < s. By Proposition 32, it suffices to show that C 1 (H t,e U n,cp ) ≤ n(s −σ ) for all n ≥ 1, and that for A = F q and sufficiently large q we have C 1 (H 
and U be as in Lemma 34.
We have σ = |U |. Denote by π : A s → A s−σ the projection on the coordinates outside U . Since σ < s, the map π is well defined. Let n ≥ 1 be an integer. Then π extends component-wise to a map : (A s ) n → (A s−σ ) n . Let C ⊆ (A s ) n be a capacity-achieving good code for H t,e U n,cp . To obtain the upper bound, it suffices to show that the restriction of to C is injective. Take x, x ∈ C, and assume (x) = (x ). We will show that x = x . Write x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ). By definition of , we have π(x k ) = π(x k ) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n. By Lemma 34, there exist L-tuples
Since C is good for H t,e U n,cp , we have x = x . Thus the restriction of to C is injective, as desired. We now prove that the upper bounds in the theorem are tight for A = F q and q sufficiently large. As already stated at the beginning of the proof, it suffices to show that C 1 (H 
Let C ⊆ A s be any code with minimum distance d H (C) = σ + 1 and cardinality q s−σ . We will prove that C is good for H t,e U. Let x, x ∈ C with x = x , and assume by way of contradiction that there exists z ∈ H t,e U(x) ∩ H t,e U(x ). For 1 ≤ ≤ L construct the sets
Thus z, x and x coincide in at least s − σ components, and therefore d H (x, x ) ≤ σ , a contradiction.
D. Hamming-Type Channels Over Product Alphabets
We now consider channels of the form Consider an adversary who has access to all the s com-
the adversary can corrupt up to t sub-components of x i , and erase at most e of them. This scenario is modeled as follows.
Definition 36: Let t, e ≥ 0 be integers. The channel H t,e B, m, s :
We conclude this section computing the capacity and the zero-error capacity of a channel of the form H t,e B, m, s. In the following theorem capacities are expressed as logarithms in base |A| = |B| m .
Theorem 37: Let t, e ≥ 0 be integers. We have
Moreover, all the above inequalities are achieved with equality if A = F q and q is sufficiently large. 
IV. NETWORKS, ADVERSARIES, AND CAPACITY REGIONS
In this section we start the analysis of networks by studying combinational networks, network alphabets, network codes, and adversaries. We show that these objects naturally induce families of adversarial channels, which determine the capacity regions of multi-source network under various adversarial models.
A. Combinational Networks
In the sequel, A denotes a finite set with cardinality |A| ≥ 2, which we call the network alphabet.
Definition 38:
Note that we allow multiple parallel directed edges. We also assume that the following hold. The Communication Model: We are interested in multicast problems over a network N = (V, E, S, T). Our model will encompass the presence of one or multiple adversaries, capable of corrupting the values of some network edges, or erasing them, according to certain restrictions.
The sources attempt to transmit information packets to all the terminals simultaneously, sharing the network resources. The packets are drawn from the network alphabet A.
The intermediate vertices emit packets that belong to the same alphabet A, but collect over the incoming edges packets that belong a priori to the extended network alphabetÂ = A ∪ {}, where / ∈ A is a symbol denoting an erasure. We assume that every edge of N can carry precisely one element from A, or possibly the erasure symbol . For example, if the sources transmit vectors of length m with entries from a finite field F q , then A = F m q , and each edge carries m log 2 (q) bits (and possibly the symbol ).
In every channel use, an intermediate vertex collects packets over the incoming edges, processes them, and sends out packets over the outgoing edges. The outgoing packets are a function of the incoming packets. The intermediate vertices are memoryless, and all network transmissions are delay-free.
Removing idle edges if necessary, we may also assume without loss of generality that every vertex sends information packets over every outgoing edge. Along with property (G) of Definition 38, this ensures in particular that every non-source vertex receives a packet on each of its incoming edges.
Notation 39: In the sequel we work with a fixed combinational network N = (V, E, S, T). We choose an enumeration for the sources of N , say S = {S 1 , . . . , S N }, and let I := {1, . . . , N} be the set of source indices. For J ⊆ I , we let
The topology of N induces a partial order on E as follows. For e, e ∈ E, we have e e if and only if there exists a directed path in N whose first edge is e and whose last edge is e . Since N is a directed and acyclic graph, is well defined. Such partial order can be extended to a total order on E (see [29, Sec. 22] ). Throughout this paper, we fix such an order extension and denote it by ≤. The choice of ≤ will prevent ambiguities in the interpretation of the objects associated with N . None of the results in this paper depends on the specific choice of ≤.
B. Network Codes and Network Channels
As mentioned in Subsection IV-A, each intermediate vertex of N applies some function to the incoming packets, and transmits the value of this function on the outgoing edges.
Definition 40:
Assume A = F m q for some prime power q and some integer m ≥ 1. Then we say that F is linear if for all vertices
When F is a linear network code and V ∈ V \ (S ∪ T), we sometimes denote the matrix L V by F V . In the remainder of the section we define some deterministic channels induced by a network code F . Definition 41: Let F be a network code for N , and let E ⊆ E be a non-empty set of edges. In an error-free context, by definition of network code, the values of the edges from E can be expressed as function of the sources input x ∈ X = X 1 × · · · X N . This defines a deterministic channel
that associates to x ∈ X the alphabet packets observed over the edges in E , ordered according to ≤.
Now assume that T ∈ T, and that E is a cut that separates all sources S 1 , . . . , S N from T . We will construct a deterministic channel that describes the transfer from the edges in E to the terminal T .
Recall from Poset Theory that e ∈ E covers e ∈ E when e / e, and there is no e ∈ E with e / e / e. We recursively define sets of edges via E 0 := in(T ) and
For all k ∈ N, E k+1 is the union of E ∩ E k and the set of network edges that immediately precede the edges in
where the minimum is well defined by property (G) of Definition 38 and the fact that E is a cut that separates S and T .
For all 0 ≤ k ≤ k − 1, the values of the edges in E k can be expressed, via F , as a function of the values of the edges in E k+1 . This defines k functions F [k] :Â |E k+1 | → A |E k | , for 0 ≤ k ≤ k − 1 (see the following Example 42). Note that we define F [k] to be the identity on the edges in the intersection
expresses the values of the edges of in(T ) as a function of the values of the edges from E k ⊆ E (note that E k might be a proper subset of E ). We trivially extend to a function : A |E | → A |in(T )| that expresses the values of the edges from in(T ) as a function of the values of the edges from E . This defines a deterministic channel
Example 42: Let N be the network in Figure 1 . The edges of N are ordered according to their indices. The set E := {e 2 , e 5 } is an edge-cut between S = {S} and T . The edges in E are represented by a dashed arrow in Figure 1 . Fix a network code F for N . Following the notation of Definition 41, we have
and
Remark 43: The deterministic channels introduced in Definition 41 are well defined for any edge-cut E that separates the network sources from T . In particular, we do not require E to be a minimum cut or an antichain cut (i.e., a cut where every two distinct edges are not comparable with respect to the order ). For example, the cut E of Example 42 is not an antichain, as e 2 e 5 . Observe moreover that whenever E is a non-antichain cut, the channel F [E → in(T )] automatically gives "priority" to the edges in E that are "closer" to the destination T in the network topology.
The specific definition of the channel F [E → in(T )] makes it so that all the results of this paper (such as decomposition results and upper bounds) also hold for edge-cuts that do not form an antichain with respect to . This is different, e.g., from the general approach of [2] , where some of the cutset bounds are derived only for the special case of antichain edge-cuts (see in particular [1, Th. 3] ).
Remark 44: If T ∈ T and E is a cut between S and T , then the channel describing the transfer from S to T factors through
For a non-antichain cut E the above decomposition does not simply follow from the fact that E is a cut between S and in(T ), and heavily relies on the specific construction of the
We now examine channels that are obtained by "freezing" the packets emitted by some of the network sources. These deterministic channels will play an important role in Section V.
Definition 45: Let F be a network code for N , and let J I be a proper non-empty subset of source indices. Fix an element x ∈ i∈I \ J X i , and let E ⊆ E be non-empty. We denote by
the deterministic channel that associates to an input x ∈ i∈J X i the values of the edges from E when the sources in S J emit the corresponding packets from x ∈ i∈J X i , and the sources in S I \ J emit the corresponding (fixed) packets from x ∈ i∈I \ J X i . Let T ∈ T be a terminal, and let E be a cut that separates S J from T . Reasoning as in Definition 41, it is easy to see that the values of the edges from in(T ) can be expressed, given the network code F , as a function of the values of the edges from E and by x. This defines a deterministic channel Remark 46: The channel describing the transfer from S J to T , given the input x, again factors through any cut E between S J and T , i.e.,
C. Network Adversaries
We now model an adversary capable of corrupting the values of the edges of N , or erasing them, according to certain restrictions. We denote such an adversary by A. The vertices process the incoming packets using a network code F .
Remark 47: In practice, we specify an adversary A on N by describing, for any given network code F for N , any message x ∈ i∈I X i , and any non-empty subset of network edges E ⊆ E, the variety of packets that the adversary can cause to be observed over the edges of E . More formally, an adversary A can be defined as a collection of channels
indexed by all possible network codes on N and all nonempty subsets of the network edges. Note that this models a wide variety of possible adversarial scenarios.
Definition 48: Let F be a network code for N , and let T ∈ T be a terminal. We let
denote the channel that associates to an input x ∈ i∈I X i the variety of packets that can be observed over the edges of in(T ) in the presence of the adversary A. Similarly, when J ⊆ I is a non-empty subset of source indices, we denote by
the channel that associates to x ∈ i∈ J X i the variety of packets that can be observed over the edges from E when, in the presence of the adversary A, the sources in S J emit the corresponding packets from x ∈ i∈J X i , and the sources in S I \ J emit the corresponding (fixed) packets from x ∈ i∈I \ J X i . Example 49: Let N be the network in Figure 2 . We order the edges of N according to their indices. The input alphabet
Consider an adversary A able to erase at most one of the values of the dotted edges of N , i.e., {e 4 , e 6 , e 7 }. This scenario is modeled by a
We can describe this channel as follows.
where ω is the erasure weight of Definition 24. Now let J := {1}, and assume that S 2 emits a fixed element
We conclude this subsection by introducing a general class of network adversaries, acting on sets of edges with limited error and erasure power.
Notation 50: Let U ⊆ E be a set of network edges, and let t, e ≥ 0 be integers. We denote by A t,e U an adversary having access only to edges from U, being able to erase up to e of them, and change the values of up to t of them with different symbols from A.
Let L ≥ 1 be an integer, and let U 1 , . . . , U L ⊆ E be pairwise disjoint subsets of network edges. Let t 1 , . . . , t L and e 1 , . . . , e L be non-negative integers. Define the L-tuples U := (U 1 , . . . , U L ), t := (t 1 , . . . , t L ) and e := (e 1 , . . . , e L ). We denote by A t,e U the adversary representing the scenario where all the A t ,e U 's act simultaneously on the network, possibly with coordination.
D. Capacity Regions of Adversarial Networks
In this section, in analogy with the theory of point-to-point adversarial channels, we propose definitions of one-shot, zeroerror, and compound zero-error capacity regions of adversarial networks.
The one-shot capacity region, as the name suggests, measures the number of alphabet symbols that the sources can multicast to all terminals in a single use of the network. The zero-error capacity region measures the average number of packets that can be multicasted to the terminals per network use, in the limit where the number of uses goes to infinity. Finally, the compound zero-error capacity regions measures the average number of packets that can be multicasted to the terminals per network use, in the limit where the number of uses goes to infinity, and in the scenario where the adversary is forced to operate on the same (unknown) set of edges in every network use.
Remark 51: A definition of capacity region was proposed in [23, Sec. IV] in the context of adversarial random network coding. The definition of [23] is probabilistic, and best suited to study random linear approaches to multicast. In particular, it does not coincide with the notion of capacity originally proposed in [2] for single-source adversarial networks (see, for example, [2, Th. 1]). Our approach to adversarial network channels is combinatorial, rather than probabilistic. As a consequence, the three notions of capacity region introduced in this paper are different from the one proposed in [23] .
Definition 52: The (one shot) capacity region of (N , A) is the set R 1 (N , A) for which there exist a network code F for N and non-empty sets C i ⊆ X i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ N, with the following properties:
: T ∈ T}. The conditions in Definition 52 guarantee that the sources can transmit in one shot to each of the sinks α 1 + · · · + α N alphabet symbols, α i of which are emitted by S i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Note that the code C is by definition a Cartesian product. This models the scenario where the sources cannot coordinate.
Remark 53: Let n ≥ 1 be an integer. The n-th Cartesian power X n = (X 1 ×· · ·×X N ) n can be naturally identified with the set X n 1 × · · · × X n N . Therefore if T ∈ T and F 1 , . . . , F n are network codes for N , we can see a product channel of the
We now introduce the zero-error capacity region.
Definition 54: The zero-error capacity region of (N , A) is the closure R 0 (N , A) of the set R 0 (N , A) of all the N-tuples (α 1 , . . . , α N ) ∈ R N ≥0 for which there exist: • an integer n ≥ 1, • network codes F 1 , . . . , F n for N , • non-empty sets C i ⊆ X n i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ N, with the following properties: 1) log |A| |C i | = n · α i , 2) C = C 1 × · · · × C N is good for each of the channels in n k=1
, in the sense of (1).
Remark 55: When the network vertices operate in a memoryless or causal way, then doubling the length of the network messages (i.e., assuming that the alphabet is A × A instead of A) does not model two uses of the network, as the following example shows.
Example 56: Let N be the network in Figure 3 , and let A := F 2 be the network alphabet. The edges are ordered according to their indices. Consider an adversary who can only operate on the edges from E = {e 3 , e 4 , e 5 , e 6 } by possibly corrupting the value of one of these edges. The action of the adversary is described by the channel H : Observe that a network code for N is the assignment of a function F V : F 2 2 → F 4 2 , as erasures are excluded from the model.
Assume that the network is used twice, with network codes F 1 and F 2 in the first and second channel use, respectively. The channel describing the two uses of the network is the product channel 4 2 , and that for all x 4 ) ). We will show that C 1 ( 1 ) < log 2 5. Assume by contradiction that there exists a code C ⊆ F 2 2 × F 2 2 with |C| = 5 and which is good for 1 . Then
is a good code for the channel H 2 of cardinality five. Since |C| = 5, there must exist x, x ∈ C with x = x and (x 1 ,
is a good code for H 2 of cardinality five which has two distinct codewords that coincide in the first four components. However, as shown in Example 9, there is no such a code. Thus C 1 ( 1 ) < log 2 5, as claimed.
Now assume that the edges can carry symbols from F 2 ×F 2 . Using Example 9 one can show that there exists a function
We now focus on composite adversaries of type A t,e U , where L ≥ 1, and U , t and e are as in Notation 50. Assume that the network N is used multiple times, and that the L adversaries A t 1 ,e 1 U 1 , . . . , A t L ,e L U L defining A t,e U are forced to operate on the same set of edges in each use of the network. This scenario naturally motivates the following definition.
Definition 57: Let L ≥ 1, U , t and e be as in Notation 50, and assume A = A t,e U . The compound zero-error capacity region of (N , A) is the closure R 0,cp (N , A) of the set R 0,cp (N , A) of all the N-tuples (α 1 , . . . , α N ) ∈ R N ≥0 for which there exist:
• an integer n ≥ 1, • network codes F 1 , . . . , F n for N , • non-empty sets C i ⊆ X n i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ N, with the following properties:
Remark 58: It follows from the definitions that
for any adversary A. Moreover, if A is of the form A = A t,e U then R 0 (N , A) ⊆ R 0,cp (N , A) . In particular, we have R 0 (N , A) ⊆ R 0,cp (N , A) .
V. PORTING BOUNDS FOR HAMMING-TYPE CHANNELS TO NETWORKS
In this section we show how the properties of channel products, concatenations and unions established in Section II-C can be combined with each other to obtain upper bounds for the three capacity regions of an adversarial network. The idea behind our approach is to derive cut-set bounds by porting, in a systematic manner, upper bounds for the three capacities of Hamming-type channels to networks.
Notation 59: In the sequel we follow the notation of Section IV, and fix a network N = (V, E, S, T) with alphabet A. The sources are S = {S 1 , . . . , S N }, and I = {1, . . . , N} is the set of source indices. The alphabet of source S i is X i := A |out(S i )| , for 1 ≤ i ≤ N, and X := X 1 × · · · × X N . We work with a generic adversary A and a fixed linear extension ≤ of the network partial order .
A. Method Description
Suppose that we are interested in describing the one-shot capacity region R 1 (N , A) (N , A) be arbitrary. By Definition 52, there exist a network code F for N and a code C = C 1 ×· · ·×C N ⊆ X 1 × · · · × X N such that (F , C) achieves (α 1 , . . . , α N ) in one shot.
Let J I be a non-empty subset of source indices, and let T ∈ T be a terminal. Take a cut E ⊆ E that separates S J from T , and fix an element x ∈ i∈I \ J C i . Assume for the moment that there is no adversary A. As observed in Remark 46, the channel J
Denote by Id[E → E ] : A |E | Â |E | the identity channel (see Example 3), and observe that equation (2) can be trivially re-written as
We now let the adversary A act only on the cut E , and assume that its action on the edges of E can be described by a channel [A; E → E ] : A |E | Â |E | . For example, if A was originally able to corrupt the values of up to t edges of N , we now consider the scenario where A can corrupt up to t edges from E . This action is described by the channel H t,0 U : A |E | Â |E | of Definition 25, with s := |E | and U := [s] = {1, . . . , s}. Therefore we can simply take
Going back to our general discussion, observe that letting the adversary A operate only on E replaces the channel
Note moreover that
, as in the former channel the action of the adversary was restricted to E . In symbols (see
Now observe that the code i∈J C i is good for the channel J F [A; S J → in(T ) | x]. Indeed, i∈I C i is a good code for F [A; S → in(T )] by definition of one-shot capacity region, and x ∈ i∈I \ J C i . Using (5) , we see that i∈J C i is good for the channel J F [A; S J → in(T ) | x] as well. In particular,
where C 1 denotes the one-shot capacity (expressed as a logarithm in base |A|), and the last inequality follows combining equation (4) and Proposition 17. We therefore obtained in (6) an upper-bound for the capacity region R 1 (N , A) in terms of the capacity of the channel [A; E → E ] : A |E | Â |E | , which does not depend on the specific choice of the network code F .
A similar (and in fact easier) argument can be given for the case J = I .
B. Porting Lemmas
In this subsection we establish two general lemmas that formalize the argument presented in Subsection V-A, and extend it to the zero-error and to the compound zero-error capacity regions. Note that these extensions do not directly follow from the discussion in the previous subsection, and heavily rely on the properties of channel concatenation and union established in Subsection II-C.
Lemma 60: Let {[A; E → E ] : E ⊆ E, E = ∅} be a family of adversarial channels such that [A; E → E ] : A |E | Â |E | for all E . Assume that for all network codes F for N : N , A) and for all non-empty subset J ⊆ I we have
is a cut between S J and T }. (7) 2) For all (α 1 , . . . , α N ) ∈ R 0 (N , A) and for all non-empty subset J ⊆ I we have
is a cut between S J and T }. (8) Proof: We only show the two properties for J I . The proof for the case J = I is similar and easier. Part 1 was essentially already shown in Subsection V-A. The details are left to the reader.
Let us show part 2. Since the inequalities in (8) define a closed set in R N , it suffices to show the result for R 0 (N , A) . Fix an arbitrary (α 1 , . . . , α N ) ∈ R 0 (N , A) . Let n ≥ 1, F 1 , . . . , F n and C = C 1 × · · · × C N ⊆ X n 1 × · · · × X n N be as in Definition 54. Take an element
Let T ∈ T be a terminal, and let E be a cut that separates S J from T . To simplify the notation throughout the proof, for all
We can now apply Corollary 19 to equation (9) , and obtain
By assumption,
Since, by definition of R 0 (N , A) , the code C is good for
Thus by Proposition 17 we conclude that
The final result can be obtained by minimizing over all T ∈ T and E . In the remainder of the section we establish an analogous porting lemma for the compound zero-error capacity. We start by defining Hamming-type channels associated with an adversary of type A = A t,e U .
Definition 61: Let L ≥ 1, U , t and e be as in Notation 50, and let V = (V 1 , . . . , V L ) ⊆ U be arbitrary (possibly V = U ). Take a non-empty subset of edges E ⊆ E, and set s := |E |. Denote by e 1 < e 2 < · · · < e s the edges in E, sorted according to the linear order extension ≤. For all 1 ≤ ≤ L, . . . , V L ) and H t,e V is the Hamming-type channel introduced in Definition 27.
The channel H t,e V, E can be interpreted as the "projection" of the adversary A t,e V on E . In particular, note that E determines the size of the input/output alphabets of the channel H t,e V, E .
We can now state the Compound Porting Lemma. Lemma 62: Let U , t and e be as in Notation 50, and assume that A = A t,e U . Then for all (α 1 , . . . , α N ) ∈ R 0,cp (N , A) and for all non-empty subset J ⊆ I we have
is a cut between S J and T }.
Sketch of the Proof:
As in the proof of Lemma 60, take (α 1 , . . . , α N ) ∈ R 0,cp (N , A) , and let n ≥ 1, F 1 , . . . , F n and C = C 1 × · · · × C N ⊆ X n 1 × · · · × X n N be as in Definition 57. Fix any element x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ i∈I \ J C i . Let T ∈ T be a terminal, and let E be a cut between S J and T . To simplify the notation throughout the proof, for V ⊆ U and for 1 ≤ k ≤ n we define As in the proof of Lemma 60, by Proposition 17 we conclude
where the last inequality can be shown using the definition of H t,e V, E (see Definition 61).
VI. CAPACITY REGIONS: UPPER BOUNDS
In this section we apply the theoretical bounds established in Section V to concrete networking contexts. Our results study one-shot models, zero-error models, and compound zero-error models. Moreover, they cover several classes of network adversaries, including multiple adversaries, restricted adversaries, different types of error/erasure adversaries, and rank-metric adversaries (see Section VIII). The bounds presented in this section do not follow in any obvious from known results in the context of network communications under probabilistic error models.
We follow the notation of Section IV, and work with a fixed network N = (V, E, S, T) over an alphabet A. The network sources are S = {S 1 , . . . , S N }, and I = {1, . . . , N} is the set of source indices. We let β be the parameter introduced in Definition 24.
Notation 63: If J ⊆ I is a non-empty subset and T ∈ T is a terminal, we denote by μ(S J , T ) the min-cut between S J and T , i.e., the minimum size of an edge-cut that separates all the sources in S J from T . By the edge-connectivity version of Menger's Theorem [30] , μ(S J , T ) coincides with the maximum number of edge-disjoint directed paths connecting S J to T .
A. One-Shot Capacity Region
We start by considering a single adversary A restricted to a set of edges U ⊆ E, with limited error and erasure powers. The following result shows that any bound from classical coding theory translates into a bound for the one-shot capacity region of (N , A) via the Porting Lemma.
Theorem 64: Let U ⊆ E be a subset, and let t, e ≥ 0 be integers. Assume A = A t,e U. For all (α 1 , . . . , α N ) ∈ R 1 (N , A) and for all non-empty J ⊆ I we have
E ⊆ E is a cut between S J and T .
In particular, if U = E then for all (α 1 , . . . , α N ) ∈ R 1 (N , A) and for all non-empty J ⊆ I we have
.
Proof: Combine Proposition 26 and part 1 of Lemma 60. The second part of the statement follows from the fact that β(|A|, u , 2t + e + 1) ≤ β(|A|, u, 2t + e + 1) for all u ≥ u ≥ 1.
Remark 65: When U E in Theorem 64, the second minimum in (12) is not realized, in general, by a minimum cut E between S J and T (examples can be easily found). Thus the topology of the set U of "vulnerable" edges plays a crucial role in the evaluation of the bound in (12) .
As special cases of Theorem 64, we obtain generalizations of the Singleton-type and Hamming-type bounds established in [2] for single-source networks. Note that any other classical bound from coding theory can be ported to the networking context via Theorem 64, in the general case where the adversary is possibly restricted to operate on a subset U ⊆ E of vulnerable edges. Observe moreover that no extra property of the edge-cuts E is needed in Theorem 64. In particular, we do not require that the sets E are antichain cuts (see also Remark 43).
Corollary 66 (Singleton-type and Hamming-type bound): Let t, e ≥ 0 be integers, and assume A = A t,e E. Then for all (α 1 , . . . , α N ) ∈ R 1 (N , A) and for all non-empty J ⊆ I we have
where t := t + e/2.
Proof: The result can be shown by combining Theorem 64 and the well known Singleton bound and Hamming bound from classical coding theory (see [31] for a general reference).
B. Other Capacity Regions
We now consider multiple adversaries acting on pairwise disjoint sets of network edges, with different error and erasure powers. In this context, the three capacity regions defined in Subsection IV-D can be upper-bounded by combining the Compound Porting Lemma with the results established in Section III.
Theorem 67: Fix an integer L ≥ 1. Let U 1 , . . . , U L ⊆ E be pairwise disjoint subsets of edges, and let t 1 , . . . , t L ≥ 0 and e 1 , . . . , e L ≥ 0 be non-negative integers. Define U := (U 1 , . . . , U L ), t := (t 1 , . . . , t L ) and e := (e 1 , . . . , e L ), and assume A = A t,e U . Then for all (α 1 , . . . , α N ) ∈ R 0,cp (N , A) and for all non-empty subset J ⊆ I we have In particular, the inequality in (13) holds for all non-empty J ⊆ I and for any N , A) and (α 1 , . . . , α N ) ∈ R 1 (N , A) . Proof: It suffices to combine Theorem 33 and Lemma 62. The second part of the statement follows from the fact that R 1 (N , A) ⊆ R 0 (N , A) ⊆ R 0,cp (N , A) , as observed in Remark 58.
We now show how to apply Theorem 67 in a concrete example.
Example 68: Let N be the network in Figure 4 . The network edges are ordered according to their indices. We consider two adversaries associated with the sets of edges U 1 = {e 5 , e 6 , e 7 } and U 2 = {e 1 , e 8 , e 9 , e 10 , e 11 , e 12 }. Both the adversaries have error power 1 and erasure power 0. In our notation, the adversary is therefore A = A t,e U , where U = (U 1 , U 2 ), t = (1, 1) and e = (0, 0).
Let (α 1 , . . . , α N ) ∈ R 0,cp (N , A) be arbitrary. Applying Theorem 67 with I = {1} and E = {e 1 , e 2 } we obtain α 1 ≤ 2 − 1 = 1. Using the same theorem with I = {2} and E = {e 5 , e 6 , e 7 , e 8 , e 9 , e 10 } we find α 2 ≤ 6 − 2 − 2 = 2. Applying again Theorem 67 with I = {1, 2} and E = {e 2 , e 5 , e 6 , e 7 , e 8 , e 9 , e 10 } we obtain α 1 + α 2 ≤ 3. Therefore by Remark 58 we deduce
. It can be shown that there exists a communication scheme that achieves the rate (α 1 , α 2 ) = (1, 2) in one shot for A = F q whenever q ≥ 4.
Theorem 67 implies the following corollary describing special types of adversaries.
Corollary 69: Let t ≥ 0 be an integer, and assume A = A t,0 E. For all (α 1 , . . . , α N ) ∈ R 0,cp (N , A) and for all non-empty J ⊆ I we have
In particular, if N is adversary-free then for all (α 1 , . . . , α N ) ∈ R 0,cp (N , A) and all ∅ = J ⊆ I we have
Moreover, the two bounds hold for all non-empty J ⊆ I and for any (α 1 , . . . , α N ) ∈ R 0 (N , A) and (α 1 , . . . , α N (N , A) .
We conclude this section studying the scenario where the network alphabet is of the form A = B m , where B is a finite set with |B| ≥ 2 and m ≥ 2 is an integer. Consider an adversary A who can erase up to e components and corrupt up to t components of each edge of the network, where t, e ≥ 0 are non-negative integers. We denote such an adversary by A t,e B, m. Combining Theorem 37 and Lemma 60 one easily obtains the following result.
Theorem 70: Let t, e ≥ 0 be non-negative integers, and assume A = A t,e B, m. Then for all (α 1 , . . . , α N ) ∈ R 0 (N , A) and for all non-empty subset J ⊆ I we have
In particular, the inequality in (14) holds for all non-empty J ⊆ I and for all (α 1 , . . . , α N ) ∈ R 1 (N , A) .
VII. CAPACITY REGIONS: CONSTRUCTIONS
This section studies the achievability of some of the upper bounds established in Section VI, both for one-shot and (compound) zero-error models. We describe communication schemes that achieve any integer point of the capacity region of certain adversarial networks. We also show that, for the case of restricted adversaries, linear network coding does not suffice in general to achieve every point in the capacity region of adversarial networks. In the sequel we follow the notation of Section VI.
A. Adversary-Free Scenario
We start by investigating the multi-source adversary-free scenario. As already observed by various authors, in this case the algebraic approach of [25] can be extended to achieve, in one shot, any integer point in the rate region described by the bound of Corollary 69, over sufficiently large fields. We include a short proof of this result, that will serve to establish the notation for the remainder of the paper.
Remark 71: Let (a 1 , . . . , a N ) ∈ N N be an integer vector that satisfies ' i∈J a i ≤ min T ∈T μ(S J , T ) for all ∅ = J ⊆ I (cf. Corollary 69). To show that (a 1 , . . . , a N ) can be achieved in one shot in an adversary-free context, it does not suffice to directly apply the approach of [25] to the network obtained from N by adding a super-source connected to all the sources S 1 , . . . , S N with an arbitrarily large number of edges. Indeed, this approach would only show that there exists a communication scheme that allows the set of sources {S 1 , . . . , S N } to transmit to all the terminals at a global rate of a 1 + a 2 + · · · + a N . However, such a scheme does not necessarily allow each source S i to transmit at the prescribed rate a i , for all i ∈ I . This issue can be solved by extending the algebraic approach of [25] to multi-source networks via the following Graph Theory lemma. Since we could not find a complete proof for this result in any reference, we include one for completeness in Appendix.
Lemma 72: Let (a 1 , . . . , a N ) ∈ N N be an integer N-tuple such that ' i∈J a i ≤ min T ∈T μ(S J , T ) for all non-empty J ⊆ I . Then for each terminal T ∈ T there exist a 1 + a 2 +· · ·+a N edge-disjoint directed paths connecting S = {S 1 , . . . , S N } to T , a i of which originate in S i for all i ∈ I .
Theorem 73: Assume A = A 0,0 E. We have
provided that A = F q and q is sufficiently large. Moreover, every integer rate vector (a 1 , . . . , a N ) as above can be achieved in one shot employing linear network coding. Proof : Let (a 1 , . . . , a N ) ∈ N N be a vector such that ' i∈J a i ≤ min T ∈T μ(S J , T ) for all ∅ = J ⊆ I . By Lemma 72, for each terminal T ∈ T there exist a 1 +· · ·+a N edge-disjoint paths connecting S to T , of which a i originate in S i for all i ∈ I . Without loss of generality, we may assume that there is neither an edge nor a vertex of N which is not on at least one of these |T| · (a 1 + · · · + a N ) paths. In particular, source S i has at least a i outgoing edges for all i ∈ I , and every terminal T has exactly a := a 1 + · · · + a N incoming edges (we are using property (F) of Definition 38).
For all i ∈ I , we let the local code of source S i to be of the form
Since erasures are excluded from the model, to construct a linear network code F for N it suffices to assign an (|in(V )|×
In analogy with [25] , we introduce a variable for each entry of each of the matrices E i and F V , for i ∈ I and V ∈ V \ (S∪T). We denote these variables by ζ 1 , . . . , ζ M , and let ζ := (ζ 1 , . . . , ζ M ). In the sequel, the E i 's and F V 's are denoted by E i (ζ ) and F V (ζ ), to stress the dependency on ζ . An evaluation ζ = (ζ 1 , . . . , ζ M ) ∈ F M q of the variables induces matrices E i (ζ ), for i ∈ I , and a linear network code F (ζ ) for N . Moreover, for all T ∈ T and for all (x 1 , . . . ,
for some a × a transfer matrix M T (ζ ) whose entries are polynomials in ζ 1 , . . . , ζ M evaluated at ζ . Note that the matrix M T (ζ ) has size a × a by property (F) of Definition 38.
By definition of one-shot capacity region, to prove the theorem it suffices to show that, for a large enough q, there exists an evaluation ζ of the variables such that each matrix M T (ζ ), T ∈ T, is invertible. As in [25] , this fact follows from the Sparse Zeros Lemma (see, e.g., [32, Lemma 1] ) and the existence of the routing solutions. The details of this part of the argument are left to the reader.
The invertibility of the M T (ζ )'s implies that each E i (ζ ), i ∈ I , is injective as a linear map. This shows that log |A| |C i | = a i for all i ∈ I , defining local codes for the sources of the expected cardinality.
B. Single Error-Adversary With Access to All Edges
In this subsection we focus on adversaries of the form A = A t,0 E, and show that every integer vector (a 1 , . . . , a N ) ∈ N N in the region described by Corollary 69 can be achieved in one shot, provided that A = F m q , and that q and m are sufficiently large. Our scheme is a simple modification of an idea from [23] , in which the authors propose a scheme in the context of random linear network coding based on towers of finite fields. In the proof of the following theorem we use the same method to construct the local codes for the network sources.
Theorem 74: Let t ≥ 0 be an integer, and assume A = A t,0 E. Let (a 1 , . . . , a N 
Then (a 1 , . . . , a N ) ∈ R 1 (N , A) , provided that A = F m q , q is sufficiently large, and m = i∈I :a i =0 (a i + 2t). Moreover, every rate vector (a 1 , . . . , a N ) as above can be achieved in one shot with linear network coding.
Proof: We will show the theorem only for N = 2 sources and in the case where, for any terminal T ∈ T, we have
Observe that a 1 ≤ μ(S 1 , T ), a 2 +2t ≤ μ(S 2 , T ), and a 1 +(a 2 + 2t) ≤ μ(S, T ). Assume without loss of generality a 1 , a 2 > 0.
By Lemma 72, for each T ∈ T there exist a 1 +a 2 +2t edgedisjoint paths connecting S to T , of which a 1 originate in S 1 , and a 2 + 2t originate in S 2 . Moreover, as a 1 + 2t ≤ μ(S 1 , T ), there exist a 1 + 2t edge-disjoint paths connecting S 1 to T . Without loss of generality, we may assume that there is neither an edge nor a vertex of N which is not on at least one of these |T| · (a 1 + a 2 + 2t + a 1 + 2t) = |T| · (2a 1 + a 2 + 4t) paths. Finally, for ease of notation define: n 1 := a 1 + 2t, n 2 := a 2 + 2t, q 1 := q n 1 , q 2 := q n 2 1 , b 1 := |out(S 1 )|, b 2 := |out(S 2 )|.
Before describing a communication scheme that achieves (a 1 , a 2 ) in one shot, following [23] we introduce some maps needed in the sequel. Fix finite fields F q ⊆ F q 1 ⊆ F q 2 and bases {β 1 1 , . . . , β n 1 1 }, {β 1 2 , . . . , β n 2 2 } for F q 1 and F q 2 over F q and F q 1 , respectively. We denote by ϕ 1 : F q 1 → F n 1 ×1 q the F qisomorphism that expands an element of F q 1 over the basis {β 1 1 , . . . , β n 1 1 }. Similarly, we denote by ϕ 2 : F q 2 → F n 2 ×1 q 1 the F q 1 -isomorphism that expands an element of F q 2 over the basis {β 1 2 , . . . , β n 2 2 }. Extend the maps ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 entry-wise to matrices or arbitrary size over F q 1 and F q 2 , respectively. Note that the entries of matrices are always expanded as column vectors.
We now describe the communication scheme. Set m := n 1 n 2 , so that A = F n 1 n 2 q is the network alphabet. Let G 1 ∈ F a 1 ×n 1 q 1 be the generator matrix of a rank-metric code D 1 ⊆ F n 1 q 1 with dim F q 1 (D 1 ) = a 1 and minimum rank distance 2t + 1 over F q (see [33] ). Similarly, let G 2 ∈ F a 2 ×n 2 q 2 be the generator matrix of a rank-metric code D 2 ⊆ F n 2 q 2 with dim F q 2 (D 2 ) = a 2 and minimum rank distance 2t + 1 over F q 1 .
Source S 1 chooses an arbitrary matrix X 1 ∈ F n 2 ×a 1 q 1 , computes X 1 G 1 ∈ F n 2 ×n 1 q 1 , and sends over the outgoing edges the columns of the matrix ϕ 1 (
is a local encoding matrix to be determined. Source S 2 chooses an arbitrary X 2 ∈ F 1×a 2 q 2 , computes X 2 G 2 ∈ F 1×n 2 q 2 , and sends over the outgoing edges the columns of the matrix
is another local encoding matrix that will be chosen later in the proof.
The vertices in V \ (S ∪ T) process the incoming packets using a linear network code F . According to Definition 40, we therefore need to assign to every V ∈ V \ (S ∪ T) an |in(V )| × |out(V )| matrix F V over F q (erasures are excluded from the model).
As in the proof of Theorem 73, we introduce a variable for each entry of each of the matrices E i and F V , for i ∈ {1, 2} and V ∈ V \ (S∪T). We denote these variables by ζ 1 , . . . , ζ M , and let ζ := (ζ 1 , . . . , ζ M ). In the sequel, the E i 's and F V 's are denoted by E i (ζ ) and F V (ζ ). Note that an evaluation ζ = (ζ 1 , . . . , ζ M ) ∈ F M q of the variables induces matrices E i (ζ ), for i ∈ {1, 2}, and a linear network code F (ζ ) for N . Moreover, for all T ∈ T and for all X 1 ∈ F n 2 ×a 1 q 1 and Using the existence of routing solutions and the Sparse Zeros Lemma (e.g., [32, Lemma 1]), it can be shown that there exists an evaluation ζ ∈ F M q of the variables such that, for all T ∈ T, the matrices
are both right-invertible (or equivalently full-rank), provided that q is sufficiently large (for details about the matrix A T (ζ ), see the proof of [23, Lemma 2]). In the sequel we fix such an evaluation ζ , and simply write E 1 ,
The local codes for sources S 1 and S 2 are, respectively,
where the network packets are again organized as column vectors. Since the matrices in (15) and (16) are full-rank, the matrices E 1 and E 2 are full-rank as well (and thus rightinvertible). Thus we have |C 1 | = |F n 2 ×a 1 q 1 | = q ma 1 and |C 2 | = |F 1×a 2 q 2 | = q ma 2 . Therefore it remains to prove that C 1 × C 2 is good for each channel F [A; S → in(T )], T ∈ T. We will show this by explicitly giving a decoding procedure. In the remainder of the proof the packets will be always organized as column vectors. A terminal T ∈ T receives
where Z is an error matrix such that rk F q (Z T ) ≤ t (see [15, Sec. IV] for details). Applying ϕ −1 1 to both sides of (17), and using the fact that such map is F q -linear, the terminal computes
Terminal T can now multiply on the right both members of the previous equality by the right-inverse of A T , which is a matrix over F q 1 denoted by A −1 T , and obtain
where the second inequality follows from [23, Lemma 1] . Therefore T can delete the first a 1 columns of (18), and recover X 2 ∈ F 1×a 2 q 2 using a minimum rank-distance decoder for the code generated by G 2 . Now T uses (17) and computes
By our choice of ζ , B T is a right-invertible matrix over F q , whose right-inverse is denoted by B −1 T . Multiplying on the right both sides of (19) by B −1 T , the terminal obtains
Define X := ϕ 1 (X 1 G 1 ) and Z T := Z T B −1 T . Organize the n 1 n 2 rows of X and Z T in n 2 blocks of n 1 rows, and re-write (20) as
Therefore T can recover X by applying n 2 times a minimum rank-distance decoder for the code generated by G 1 . Clearly, this allows T to recover X 1 as well.
C. A Scheme for Two Sources and One Terminal
We now consider a network with N = 2 sources, one terminal, and adversary A = A t,0 E. Theorem 74 shows that any rate vector (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ N 2 ≥1 with a 1 ≤ μ(S 1 , T ) − 2t, a 2 ≤ μ(S 2 , T ) − 2t and a 1 + a 2 ≤ μ({S 1 , S 2 }, T ) − 2t can be achieved with linear network coding, provided that the network alphabet A is made of q-ary vectors of length (a 1 + 2t)(a 2 + 2t). In this subsection we present a different communication scheme that achieves the same rates with much shorter vectors. More precisely, the scheme requires the alphabet to be made of q-ary vectors of length a 1 + a 2 + 2t.
The idea behind our approach is to design a network code that is able to "coordinate" the two uncoordinated sources, making the terminal observe the source two messages encoded "globally" via a rank-metric code. We start by illustrating the approach in a small example.
Example 75: Let N be the network in Figure 5 . The network edges are ordered according to their indices. We consider an adversary associated with all the edges, error power 1 and erasure power 0.
Suppose that the network alphabet is A = F 4 q , where q is any prime power. We describe a communication scheme that allows the sources to reliably transmit one alphabet symbol each. The terminal T chooses the generator matrix of a rankmetric MRD code [33] in the form
Sources S 1 and S 2 will encode messages v 1 , v 2 ∈ F q 4 , respectively, using the generator matrices
respectively. Each encoded message is then transformed into a 4 × 3 matrix over F q by expanding its entries over an F q -basis of F q 4 via an F q -linear map ϕ : F q 4 → F 4 q . The map ϕ is extended entry-wise to vectors and matrices, as well as its inverse ϕ −1 . Messages are then processed as in Figure 6 (we use the fact that ϕ is F q -linear).
Applying ϕ −1 to the received vectors, terminal T can observe the encoding of (v 1 , v 2 ) via the chosen generator matrix G. Note that the vertices operation are used in the example to "coordinate" the sources and conveniently combine their encoded information.
We now show that this strategy works for every network having two sources and one terminal.
Theorem 76: Let t ≥ 0 be an integer, and assume A = A t,0 E. Suppose that N has two sources S 1 , S 2 and one terminal T . Let (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ N 2 with a 1 ≤ μ(S 1 , T ) − 2t, a 2 ≤ μ(S 2 , T ) − 2t and a 1 + a 2 ≤ μ({S 1 , S 2 }, T ) − 2t. Then (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ R 1 (N , A) , provided that A = F m q , q is sufficiently large, and m = a 1 + a 2 + 2t. Moreover, every rate vector (a 1 , a 2 ) as above can be achieved in one shot with linear network coding.
Proof of Theorem 76: We only prove the theorem in the case min{a 1 , a 2 } > 0. Without loss of generality, we may assume the following properties of N :
has a i + 2t outgoing edges for i ∈ {1, 2}, and T has a 1 + a 2 + 2t incoming edges. Indeed, if this is not the case, then we can introduce virtual nodes S 1 , S 2 and T connected to S 1 , S 2 and T with a 1 + 2t, a 2 + 2t and a 1 + a 2 + 2t directed virtual edges (respectively). Using Menger's Theorem [30] one can show that this produces a network N with μ ( (N , A) , it suffices to show the theorem for N . In other words, we can assume without loss of generality that N satisfies the two properties described at the beginning of the proof.
In the sequel, we denote by ϕ : F q m → F m q the F q -isomorphism that expands an element of F q m over a given basis {β 1 , . . . , β m } of F q m /F q , as a columns vector (the basis is irrelevent). We extend ϕ entry-wise to vectors of arbitrary length and entries in F q m . The inverse of ϕ is also extended entry-wise.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, source i will select an arbitrary vector v i ∈ F a i q m , and will send over the outgoing edges the columns of a matrix of the form
where
q are matrices to be determined. The vertices in V \ (S ∪ T) process the incoming packets using a linear network code F .
We will first construct the matrices E i 's the network code F V . The matrices F i 's and G i 's will be constructed later.
As in the proof of Theorem 73, we introduce a variable for each entry of each of the matrices E i and F V , for i ∈ {1, 2} and V ∈ V \ (S ∪ T). We denote these variables by ζ 1 , . . . , ζ M , and let ζ := (ζ 1 , . . . , ζ M ). In the sequel, the E i 's and F V 's are denoted by E i (ζ ) and F V (ζ ). An evaluation ζ = (ζ 1 , . . . , ζ M ) ∈ F M q of the variables induces matrices E i (ζ ), for i ∈ {1, 2}, and a linear network code F (ζ ). Moreover, for all v i , G i and F i , i ∈ {1, 2}, we have
where the packets are organized as column vectors, and M T (ζ ) is the transfer matrices from both sources S 1 and S 2 to the terminal T . This matrix is well defined in the context of erasure-free linear network coding, and their entries are polynomials in ζ 1 , . . . , ζ M evaluated at ζ . Note that the size of M T (ζ ) is (a 1 + a 2 + 4t) × (a 1 + a 2 + 2t).
Combining Lemma 72, the existence of the routing solutions, and the Sparse Zeros Lemma (e.g., [32, Lemma 1] ), it can be shown that there exists an evaluation ζ ∈ F M q of the variables, for q sufficiently large, such that:
• the matrix formed by the first a 1 +2t +a 2 rows of M T (ζ ) is invertible; • the matrix formed by the last a 2 + 2t rows of M T (ζ ) is full-rank. In the sequel we fix such an evaluation ζ , and simply write E 1 , E 2 , F and M T . We will need the following preliminary result.
Claim 1:
Proof of the Claim: The result follows from the two properties of the matrix M T described above. One can show that there exist suitable invertible column and row operations that make M T of the desired form (note that not all invertible rows operations are allowed). The details of the proof are omitted.
We take as matrices F 1 and F 2 in (21) precisely those constructed in the claim. To construct the G i 's, let
be the generator matrix of an F q m -linear MRD code [33] of minimum rank distance 2t + 1. Then define
Assume for the moment that the network is error-free, and that S 1 and S 2 emit ϕ(v 1 · G 1 )F 1 E 1 and ϕ(v 2 · G 2 )F 2 E 2 , respectively. Terminal T obtains
Therefore T can compute
In other words, by performing only linear operations over F q , the terminal can recover the encoding of (v 1 | v 2 ) via G in an error-free context. Since G generates a code of minimum rank distance 2t + 1, in order to defeat the adversary the terminal can use a minimum rank distance decoder for G.
D. A Scheme for the Compound Model
In this subsection we adapt the scheme of Theorem 74 to the compound model. We show that, in this context, long network packets can be avoided by using the network multiple times.
Theorem 77: Let t ≥ 0 be an integer, and assume that A = A t,0 E. Let (a 1 , . . . , a N 
Then (a 1 , . . . , a N ) ∈ R 0,cp (N , A) , provided that A = F m q , q is sufficiently large, and m = min{a i : i ∈ I, a i = 0} + 2t. Moreover, every rate (a 1 , . . . , a N ) as above can be achieved using linear network coding.
Proof: As for Theorem 74, we show the result only for N = 2 sources and in the case where, for any T ∈ T, we have μ(S 1 , T ), μ(S 2 , T ), μ(S, T ) > 2t. Assume 0 < a 1 ≤ a 2 without loss of generality.
In the sequel we follow the notation of the proof of Theorem 74, and modify the scheme to achieve (a 1 , a 2 ) in n 2 channel uses, provided that A = F n 1 q and q is sufficiently large. In every network use, each intermediate vertex V ∈ V \ (S∪T) processes the incoming packets according to the network code F constructed in the proof of Theorem 74 (thus F is the same in every network use).
After choosing X 1 and X 2 , sources S 1 and S 2 compute
, respectively. The rows of these matrices are then organized in n 2 blocks of n 1 rows as follows:
In the j -th network use, S i sends over the outgoing edges the columns of Y j 1 E i ∈ F n 1 ×b i q , for 1 ≤ j ≤ n 2 and i ∈ {1, 2}. This defines codes C 1 , C 2 for S 1 and S 2 of cardinality q n 1 n 2 a 1 and q n 1 n 2 a 2 , respectively.
The decoding is as follows. In the j -th network use, terminal T ∈ T collects packets from F n 1 q over the incoming edges, and organizes them as the columns of a n 1 × |in(T )| matrix over F q , which is denoted by
is the matrix whose columns are the error packets, and U T is the |E| × |in(T )| transfer matrix from the edges of N to the destination T . Note that U T is well defined in the context of erasure-free linear network coding (see [15, Secs. I and IV] for details). After n 2 channel uses, terminal T constructs the matrix
where Now observe that Z T can be written as
Since the adversary acts on the same edges in each network use, the matrix W has at most t non-zero columns, which implies rk F q (Z T ) ≤ rk F q (W ) ≤ t (this fact would not be true if the adversary was able to act on a different set of edges in each use of the channel). Decoding can therefore be completed starting from equation (22), as in the proof of Theorem 74 (cf. equation (17)).
E. Product Network Alphabets
Assume that A = B m is a product alphabet, where B is a finite set with |B| ≥ 2 and m ≥ 2 is a fixed integer. The following theorem describes a capacity-achieving scheme for networks with an adversary of the form A = A t,e B, m (see Theorem 70).
Theorem 78: Let t, e ≥ 0 be integers, and let A = A t,e B, m. Assume m ≥ 2t + e + 1, and let k := m − 2t − e. Suppose that B = F q and that q is sufficiently large. Then 
F. Linear and Non-Linear Network Coding
Theorem 74 shows that linear network coding suffices to achieve any integer point in the capacity region of an adversarial network of the form (N , A t,0 E) , provided that the network alphabet is of the form F m q , with q and m sufficiently large. We now show that this is not the case in general if the adversary has the form A = A t,0 U, where U E is a proper subset of vulnerable edges.
Example 79: Let N be the network in Figure 7 . The edges of N are ordered according to their indices. Let U := {e 1 , e 2 , e 3 } E and A := A 1,0 U.
It is easy to see that 1 ∈ R 1 (N , A) for any network alphabet A. We now show that the rate 1 cannot be achieved employing a linear network code at the intermediate vertex V .
Assume that A = F m q for some prime power q and some m ≥ 1, and that the vertex V processes the incoming packets according to a linear network code F V : A 3 → A (erasures are excluded from the model). By definition of linear network code (Definition 40), there exist λ 1 , λ 2 , λ 3 
Moreover, by definition of A we have F [A; S → in(T )](x) = {λ 1 y 1 + λ 2 y 2 + λ 3 y 3 : y ∈ A 3 and y i = x i for at most one value of i }.
Assume by contradiction that there exists a good code C ⊆ A 3 for the channel F [A; S → in(T )] with |C| = |A| = q m ≥ 2. Then at least one among λ 1 , λ 2 , λ 3 must be non-zero. Without loss of generality, we may assume λ 1 = 0. Let x, x ∈ C with x = x , and define
, y 2 := x 2 , y 3 := x 3 and
VIII. OTHER ADVERSARIAL MODELS
Using the combinatorial framework developed in this work, other adversarial models can be investigated. As shown for some classes of adversaries, Lemma 60 and 62 allow to port to the network context any upper bound for the capacity of channels of the form A s Â s . We include as Supplementary Material the analysis of error-adversaries having access to overlapping sets of coordinates, and of rank-metric adversaries. See [34] and [35] for a general reference on rank-metric codes in matrix representation.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a general combinatorial framework for adversarial network coding. We have derived upper bounds for three different notions of capacity region, by porting results for Hamming-type channels to the networking context in a systematic way. Moreover, we have given some capacity-achieving communication schemes.
The results of this paper determine (for sufficiently large network alphabets) the three capacity regions of the following multi-source network adversarial models:
• error-free networks, • a single error-adversary with access to all the network edges, • a single adversary who can corrupt/erase a fraction of the components of any alphabet symbol. In the three models above, any integer point in the capacity regions can be achieved using linear network coding, possibly combined with link-level encoding/decoding. Moreover, in compound adversarial models the use of a large network alphabet (whose size grows in general exponentially with the number of sources) can be avoided by using the network multiple times.
Even small modifications of these models (such as restricting the adversary to a subset of edges) give rise to capacity regions whose integer points cannot be achieved in general with linear network coding.
In this paper, we have derived cut-set upper bounds for the three capacity regions associated with multiple (possibly coordinated) adversaries, who can only operate on prescribed subsets of the network edges. The problem of determining the capacity regions in these generalized models remains open.
APPENDIX PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 17: Property 1 is immediate. To see property 2, suppose that 1 : X 1 Y 1 and 2 : X 2 Y 2 are channels with Y 1 ⊆ X 2 . Let C ⊆ X 1 be good for 1 2 with log 2 |C| = C 1 ( 1 2 ). We will show that C is good for 1 . Assume that there exist x, x ∈ C with 1 (x) ∩ 1 (x ) = ∅, and let y ∈ 1 (x) ∩ 1 (x ). Then we have ∅ = 2 (y) ⊆ ( 1 2 )(x) ∩ ( 1 2 )(x), a contradiction. Therefore C is good for 1 , and so C 1 ( 1 ) ≥ log 2 |C| = C 1 ( 1 2 ). On the other hand, for every x ∈ C we can select y x ∈ 1 (x) ⊆ Y 1 . It is easy to check that C := {y x : x ∈ C} ⊆ X 2 is a good code for 2 with the same cardinality as C. Therefore C 1 ( 2 ) ≥ C 1 ( 1 2 ).
Proof of Proposition 18: For 1 ≤ k ≤ n and 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we denote by X k,i and Y k,i the input and output alphabets, respectively, of channel k,i . By assumption, we have Y k,i ⊆ X k,i+1 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1. We need to prove that for all (x 1,1 , . . . , x n,1 ) ∈ X 1,1 × · · · × X n,1 one has n k=1 k,1 · · · k,m (x 1,1 , . . . , x n,1 ) = n k=1 k,1 · · · n k=1 k,m (x 1,1 , . . . , x n,1 ).
We will only show the inclusion ⊆. The other containment can be seen similarly. Fix an arbitrary (y 1,m , . . . , y n,m ) ∈ n k=1 i,1 · · · i,m (x 1,1 , . . . , x n,1 ).
By definition of product, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n we have y k,m ∈ ( k,1 · · · k,m )(x k,1 ). Thus, by definition of concatenation, for any integer 1 ≤ k ≤ n there exist elements x k,2 , . . . , x k,m with x k,i ∈ k,i−1 (x k,i−1 ) ⊆ Y k,i−1 ⊆ X k,i for all 2 ≤ i ≤ m and y k,m ∈ k,m (x k,m ). Therefore we have (x 1,i , . . . , x n,i ) ∈ ( 1,i−1 × · · · × n,i−1 )(x 1,i−1 , . . . , Proof of Proposition 20: Fix any integer n ≥ 1. Combining Proposition 17 with Proposition 18 one obtains C 1 (( 1 2 ) n ) = C 1 ( n 1 n 2 ) ≤ min{C 1 ( n 1 ), C 1 ( n 2 )} = n · min C 1 ( n 1 )/n, C 1 ( n 2 )/n .
as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 22:
Denote by X j and Y j the input (resp., output) alphabets of channel j , for j ∈ {1, 2}. By definition of adversarial channel, we need to show that for all x 1 ∈ X 1 we have i∈I
Let us show the inclusion ⊆. Take an arbitrary element y 2 ∈ ( i∈I ( 1 i 2 ) (x 1 ). Then there exist ι ∈ I , y 1 ∈ Y 1 ⊆ X and y ∈ Y such that: y 1 ∈ 1 (x 1 ), y ∈ ι (y 1 ), and y 2 ∈ 2 (y). Therefore y 2 ∈ 1 ( i∈I i 2 (x 1 ), as desired. The other inclusion can be shown similarly.
Proof of Lemma 34: Part 1 is straightforward, and part 2 follows from the fact that the U 's are pairwise disjoint. Let us show part 3. For all 1 ≤ ≤ L define V := U 1 ∪ U and V := U 2 ∪ U . We claim that V := (V 1 , . . . , V L ) and V := (V 1 , . . . , V L ) have the desired properties. First of all, |V |, |V | ≤ t + e by construction. Now let x, x ∈ A s , and assume x i = x i for all i ∈ [s] \U. We will explicitly construct a vector z ∈ H t,e V (x) ∩ H t,e V (x ). Define the auxiliary sets
The previous unions are disjoint unions. Moreover, by construction, we have V ⊇ U and V ⊇ U . Define z ∈ A s as follows: for 1 ≤ i ≤ s, z i := if i ∈ U , z i := x i if i ∈ V \U , z i := x i if i ∈ V \ V , and z i := x i = x i otherwise. One can check that z ∈ H t,e V (x) ∩ H t,e V (x ).
Proof of Lemma 72: We add a vertex S / ∈ V to G := (V, E). For all i ∈ I , connect S to S i with exactly a i directed edges. This defines a new digraph G := (V , E ). Fix a terminal T ∈ T. By the edge-connectivity version of Menger's Theorem [30] , it suffices to show that the minimum size of an edge-cut between S and T (in G ) is a := a 1 + a 2 + · · · + a N , i.e., that μ(S, T ) = a, where μ is the min-cut in G .
It is clear that μ(S, T ) ≤ a. Assume by contradiction that there exists a cut ⊆ E with || < a that separates S from T . For all i ∈ I = {1, . . . s, N}, denote by E i the set of directed edges connecting S to S i , and let n i := |∩E i |. Since E i ∩E j = ∅ for all i, j ∈ I with i = j , we have
Moreover, for all i ∈ I one clearly has n i = | ∩ E i | ≤ |E i | = a i . Define J := {i ∈ I : n i < a i } ⊆ I . If J = ∅ then a i = n i for all i ∈ I . This contradicts (23) . Now assume J = ∅, and observe that for all i ∈ J the cut does not disconnect S from S i . Hence must be a cut between S J and T . As a consequence, the set \ ( i∈I \ J E i is a cut between S J and T . Therefore 
